We show that the housing wealth collapse of 2006-09 had a persistent impact on employment across US counties. In particular, localities that had a larger loss in housing net-worth during that period had more depressed employment as late as 2016, without a commensurate population response. Using IV's and controls to identify the causal impact of the wealth shock amplify those results, leading to an estimate that a 10 percent change in housing net-worth between 2006 and 2009 causes a 4.5 percent decline in local employment by 2016, as compared to a 2006 baseline. We do not find long-term causal impact of the shock on wages. Sectoral results indicate, however, that the results are unlikely to be purely a result of persistently low demand, since, contrary to the short-run effects, the effect over the longer horizon is less concentrated in the non-tradables sectors and is instead more prominent in the high-skilled services sector.
Introduction
We use regional variation in employment and housing net worth across U.S. counties and document that U.S. regions where households suffered the largest losses in housing wealth between 2006 and 2009 are also ones in which employment remained most depressed (relative to its prior trend) as late as 2016. 1 By isolating exogenous variation in housing net worth, we argue that this relationship reflects a long lasting causal effect of housing wealth on employment at the county level. Our findings contrast with the standard view in macroeconomics that, while household demand shocks could account for short-run fluctuations, long-run movements are better explained by changes in technology or other slow moving institutional factors. 2 They are more in line with recent work by Coibion et al. (2017) that find large and persistent aggregate U.S. output effects of the financial crisis.
In order to establish the line of causality from regional housing wealth to regional employment changes, we build on the seminal contribution of Mian and Sufi (2014) , and use local housing We also evaluate the impact of the housing wealth shock on local wages. We find that, while housing local net-worth losses predicts wage declines (as in Beraja et al. (2016) ), the relationship disappears when we instrument for local housing supply elasticity. This implies that, even if wages are flexible on average, wage movements did not operate as a stabilizing influence for declines in local employment demand. Strikingly, this stickiness in wages occurs in spite of the fact that outmigration occurs very slowly, with changes in working age population at the level of local labor markets (Core Based Statistical Area) that occur slowly and that even at the long horizon are smaller than the employment effects.
Next, we do an extended analysis along two important dimensions that allows us to assess the heterogeneous effects of the collapse in housing net worth across U.S. counties. First, we examine the differential impact of the housing net-worth shock in different sectors. We reproduce Mian and Sufi (2014) 's finding that the housing net-worth shock has a significant short term impact on retail and food service employment, but additionally, we find that this relationship disappears somewhat quickly, after 2010. Moreover, distinctly, where we find the strongest long-lasting effect is in the 1 This is in line from evidence from countries that were affected by large drops in housing wealth (Reinhardt and Rogoff (2009) , Jordà et al. (2015 Jordà et al. ( , 2016 ).
2 Such a view would explain the persistent drop in employment after the Great Recession through changes in demographic characteristics of the population as well as generational differences in the timing of incorporation into the labor market (Fernald et al. (2017) ).
3 Two other papers that have analyzed the aftermath of the Great Recession using state level data are Jones et al. (2018) and Gertler and Gilchrist (2018) . employment of a "skill-intensive" sector, encompassing health services, education and professional and business services. 4 Second, motivated by Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) 's findings that fast growing cities have larger employment responses to demand shocks compared to slow growing cities, we examine the differential impact of the housing net-worth shock across ex-ante differentially growing counties. For this exercise, we separate counties by their average employment growth rate from [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . We find that the housing net worth shock indeed had its largest impact dynamically on ex-ante fast growing counties.
Our results imply that shocks to household wealth can have very persistent negative effects.
What is a potential theoretical mechanism? As explained in a major contribution recently, by Berger et al. (2017) , wealth losses can affect consumption in an incomplete markets model, if housing serves as a collateral for household debt. In their framework, a reduction in housing networth reduces households ability to smooth income shocks, leading to greater precautionary savings.
This interpretation based on the theoretical framework in Berger et al. (2017) is in line with existing empirical evidence for short-run/contemporaneous impact of wealth shocks on consumption (Mian et al. (2013) , Kaplan et al. (2016) ). Such consumption effects can in turn have an impact on labor demand. If wages fail to adjust downward, this will have an impact on employment.
While such a demand channel can explain the short-run dynamics, the sectoral incidence of the shock implies a more complicated and potentially more interesting story at longer horizons. The relative decline of the high-skilled sector suggests that the demand shock likely makes the affected localities less amenable to the production of those goods.
In addition to the work we discuss above, our paper is related to several other contributions in the literature. There is ample evidence that changes in trade tariffs in local labor markets can have very persistent effects (Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017) ). Moreover, recent work by Yagan (2017) finds evidence that regional employment losses around the 2007-09 ("Great") recession are predictive of regional employment differences as late as 2015. Yagan (2017) however, does not trace those effects explicitly to losses in housing net-worth. At the same time, county level analysis by Mian and Sufi (2014) suggests that the loss in household wealth around the Great Recession can account for a large portion of the initial drop in employment between 2007 and 2009, especially among non-tradable sectors.
Together, the existing evidence suggests the presence of a causal mechanism that operates from the housing wealth losses in the Great Recession to long-term regional distribution of employment conditions. Our contribution is to provide evidence for the full causality chain running from the housing collapse to the differential employment losses over a long period of time. In addition to influential work by Reinhardt and Rogoff (2009) that shows that recoveries following financial crises driven recessions are quite slow, our results are also in line with Jordà et al. (2016) , who, using data going back to 1870s, find that recessions following large financial expansions are likely to be long lasting, and that real estate credit has become an increasingly reliable indicator of financial fragility.
Data and motivating evidence
We now describe in detail the data we use in the paper as well as present some stylized facts that serve as motivating evidence for our econometric analysis.
Data
The main data-set used for our estimations is from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), made available by the Bureau of Labor and Statistics. It draws on employment and wages of establishments reporting to Unemployment Insurance programs, and covers more than 95% of jobs in the United States. It is the data-set of choice for the BEA for the production of national accounting estimates and by the BLS as a frame for the Current Employment Statistics. 5 The data-set includes total employment and wage bill by industry and county. In an extended analysis, we also use American Community Survey (ACS) data to complement the wage regression results by constructing an adjusted nominal wage index.
In order to investigate migration patterns, we also use population data from the County Resident Population Estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau after 2000 and the U.S. Intercensal County Population data before that. Finally, we obtain debt-to-income (DTI) ratios for different counties For more details on data sources and construction, see appendix B. Figure 1 shows the recent evolution of employment and household debt in levels, and normalized by population and household income, respectively. There is a clear boom-bust cycle starting around 2003, with an increase in the employment to population ratio and an acceleration in the growth of household debt to income ratio. 6 The onset of the 2007-09 "Great" recession stands out as a prominent peak in all series. Strikingly, as debt to income ratio returns to its pre-boom levels, employment to population ratio remains depressed.
Stylized facts
We are interested in understanding how changes to household net-worth affected local employment. We follow Mian and Sufi (2014) in defining the change in household net-worth in a given region n between 2006 and 2009 by 5 As compared to the County Business Patterns it is more encompassing, since it includes government employees and a few other industries.
6 Justiniano et al. (2017) associate that acceleration in household indebtedness with a sharp reduction in the relative cost of private label mortgages issuances in the second half of 2003. That is, the change in household net-worth due to housing is given by the change in the house price index multiplied by a leverage term calculated using initial asset positions. In what follows we show results using the change in net-worth made available in Mian and Sufi (2014) replication files.
The panels in Figure 2 show in the vertical axis the change in employment in different states starting at 2006 and finishing at different horizons using data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). The horizontal axis is the same for all panels and shows the change in housing net-worth between 2006 and 2009. 7 It clearly shows that the high net-worth shock regions were also ones that suffered a more pronounced boom-bust cycle in employment.
Those comparisons do not account for differences in underlying trends across states. For example, California was a fast growing state before the housing boom-bust cycle, so that one would expect its employment to catch up with other states for that reason. In order to control for that, The upper left panel of Figure 4 shows the same fact, but with a different grouping. Rather 7 State level changes in housing net-worth is calculated by taking a weighted average of county level changes from Mian and Sufi (2014) Great Recession. It also shows that wages remained relatively higher in the least affected counties, consistent with Beraja et al. (2016) . However, the effect appears to be highly non-linear, with virtually no wage differences between the top 25% and middle 50% most affected counties. Lastly, the bottom right panel shows difference in the debt-income ratio. The counties that experienced the largest housing net-worth shocks were also the ones with the highest debt-to income ratio around 2008. Those regions then experienced the greatest degree of deleveraging. As with aggregate data (Figure 1 ), debt to income ratios had mostly converged to pre-boom levels by 2016, even as employment differentials have remained. By severity of housing net worth drop 06−09 from Mian and Sufi(2014) Notes: Employment and wage trends are calculated by taking average growth rates between 1998 and 2002 for each locality and using those to project 2002 employment linearly into the future. Detrended employment values are deviations from that trend.
3 Disentangling the employment effect of the housing wealth shock
In order to claim a causal effect of the change in housing net-worth on employment and other variables, one needs to rule out a role of other omitted factors that may have driven both variables at the same time. For instance, first, any region specific shock affecting employment persistently in a given region would also affect house prices in that region immediately. For that reason, a naive causal interpretation of the relationships showed in the previous section may lead one to over-estimate the impact of the housing wealth shock on employment. Second, for a given change in house prices, net-worth shocks increase with leverage, and regions where households were more levered at the onset of the recession may distinguish themselves from other regions in several ways, such as income level, age composition, structure of the financial system, and regulatory environment.
This would imply different exposures to various kinds of shocks that may be correlated with leverage, leading to either under or over-estimation of the coefficient. Third, households may have borrowed more aggressively if they believed that they would be better able to cope with a high debt burden, or regions with deep financial systems allow households with large debt overhangs to refinance their debt at better terms. Those considerations would imply that one would tend to under-estimate the long-run impact of the initial housing wealth shock.
An IV framework
In order to disentangle the effect of the housing net-worth shock on employment we follow Mian and Sufi (2014) in comparing regions that had more or less "elastic" housing supply as measured by the availability of land building restrictions given by geographical or regulatory constraints (Saiz (2010) ). Their idea is that in regions that had less land available, housing prices would have increased more quickly in the run-up years between 2002 and 2006, allowing households to raise more debt in comparison to their incomes. The key assumption for housing supply elasticity to be a valid instrument is that it be uncorrelated with the exposure of different localities to various shocks, and with differences in their ability to recover from those shocks. Figure 5 suggests that, especially in later periods, the strongest variation comes from comparing extreme quantiles of housing supply elasticity. This is consistent with Gao et al. (2016) , who note that the relationship between supply elasticity and housing is non-monotonic and provide a causal model consistent with that observation. Accordingly, we use a discretized version of the Saiz elasticity as our instrument. For parsimony, we use two dummies, picking up different terciles of the housing price elasticity.
Overall, in order to assess the causal dynamic effects of the initial (06-09) housing net worth shock while controlling for observable characteristics, we estimate a sequence of regression equations of the form ∆ 06−yy log(Employment n ) = β yy ∆ 06−09 Net Worth n + γ yy X n + n,yy
where n denotes a region (county or CBSA), ∆ 06−yy denotes the change in the variable between 06 and yy ∈ {09, 10, ..., 16}, and X n is a vector of regions specific controls. As in Mian and Sufi's (2014) work, we include as controls the share of 23 industries in our baseline regressions, as well as various socio-economic characteristics of the population of the region (race, income, home ownership, education, unemployment rates, poverty and urbanization) in extended specifications.
We add to those the share of government employment, which we can calculate using the QCEW data. Since we are interested in longer run effects of the housing collapse, we include controls for prior trends (growth rate in employment between 1998 and 2002 and between 2003 and 2006) in even our baseline regressions. We report the OLS estimates of β yy for comparison in several instances.
We then use a discretized version of the Saiz elasticity as an instrument for ∆ 06−09 Net Worth n , so that we can provide a causal interpretation of β yy .
3.2 Long-run causal employment effects Table 1 shows regression results from estimating (1) under different specifications for the 2006-09 period considered by Mian and Sufi (2014) . Panels A and B essentially provide replications of their Sample weights (by number of households) are applied to all specifications. ***,**, * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
findings using the QCEW employment data including, respectively, all employees and only private employees. Column 1 presents the OLS estimate without controls and Column 2 presents the OLS estimate with control for pre-trends. Even at this short horizon, controlling for pre-trends implies a stronger effect. Column 3 adds controls for industry shares, and Column 4 corresponds to Mian and Sufi's baseline specification, with housing supply elasticity as the instrument and controls for industry shares.
In Column 5 we add various controls for observables such as socio-economic characteristics of the population of the region (race, income, home ownership, education, unemployment rates, poverty and urbanization), with little change in in the estimate. Finally, Column 6 performs a placebo test taking the change in employment between 1998 and 2002 as the left hand-side variable with changes in employment between 1994 and 1998 and 1990 and 1994 taken as controls for pre-trends.
The placebo test confirms that the specification adequately removes any differences in underlying trends between counties with different housing supply elasticities. Table 2 repeats the exercise but at the 2006-2016 horizon. As one might expect, at this longer horizon the introduction of controls for pre-trends and industrial composition have a larger effect on the coefficient. The increase in the point estimate in the IV specification relative to OLS is also noteworthy. This implies that leverage may have increased more ex-ante in counties where residents had better means to deal with large fluctuations in their net-worth. 8 Sample weights (by number of households) are applied to all specifications. ***,**, * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Thus overall, in terms of magnitudes, given the baseline estimates in column 4 (the same specification as in Mian and Sufi (2014) ) of Tables 1 and 2, we To obtain an overview of the over time evolution of the cumulative employment effects of the housing net-worth shock around the Great Recession, Table 3 shows the estimated coefficient of the effect at different time horizons, as given by estimating (1), using the baseline specification (see appendix for table with specification with full controls). The coefficient increases gradually, peaking in 2015, six years after the trough of the recession as defined by the NBER. This result then summarizes our main empirical finding: the collapse in U.S. housing net worth in 2006-09 had highly persistent local employment effects over the subsequent decade.
ratio, as we show later. 2006-2009 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2014 2006-2015 2006-2016 Robust standard errors (clustered by state-level) are reported in parentheses. Sample weights (by number of households) are applied to all specifications. ***,**, * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Extended analysis
We now extend our analysis in several dimensions as well as conduct a series of robustness exercises.
Controlling for quality of life
While the Saiz (2010) instrument is plausibly orthogonal to idiosyncratic regional shocks that occurred around the time of the Great Recession, one may wonder whether they would be correlated with location-specific characteristics that may make some locations more sensitive than others to national shocks unrelated to housing wealth, or that could imply heterogeneity in the sensitivity to the housing wealth shock. This would occur because, as emphasized by Davidoff (2013) , the same presence of large bodies of water and uneven terrain that affects local housing supply elasticities are themselves attractive, leading to higher demand for housing, a more highly skilled population, and greater economic development. In order to allow for that possibility, we now introduce controls for local quality of life. Table 4 shows how allowing for these considerations change the estimates. Panel A repeats our baseline result. In Panel B, we include the measure of quality of life constructed by Albouy (2008) as a control. In order to construct it, Albouy (2008) uses after tax real wages in each location, using the result that, in a spatial equilibrium, differences in real wages between cities for a worker with the same attributes should reflect a compensating differential in local amenities. Those real wages should capture any impact the geographical features captured by the Saiz (2010) instrument on the demand for living in those places. We find that including such a control actually increases the size of the coefficient, implying that the effect of higher amenities on the local economy and population composition attenuates the effect of the housing wealth shock. 2006-2009 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2014 2006-2015 2006-2016 Robust standard errors (clustered by state-level) are reported in parentheses. Sample weights (by number of households) are applied to all specifications. ***,**, * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Panel C repeats the exercise substituting the Albouy (2008) measure for an index of local geographic amenities that is constructed by combining six measures of climate, topography, and water area that reflect preferred environmental qualities (warm winter, winter sun, temperate summer, low summer humidity, topographic variation, and water area). This is a natural amenities scale at the county level constructed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. There is again an increase in the estimated coefficient on the effect of housing net worth shock on employment. Finally, Panel D incorporates directly the possibility that the development of local financial markets may vary systematically with the geographical attributes of the city, which could lead to a bias as one may expect to see larger and more volatile household indebtedness in more financially developed regions without a commensurate impact on consumption and employment. We allow for that possibility by introducing debt to income ratio in 2002 as a control. Again, this leads to a strengthening of the coefficient of interest. 2006-2009 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2014 2006-2015 2006-2016 Robust standard errors (clustered by state-level) are reported in parentheses. Sample weights (by number of households) are applied to all specifications. ***,**, * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Local labor markets
One source of difficulty in interpreting the employment estimates we have presented so far is that, at the county level, the effect of the shock can spill over to neighboring counties. Many individuals may live in one county and work or shop in another, so that loss of employment in a locality need not be borne by local population in the same way as in completely self contained regions. To deal with these issues, Table 5 reproduces the results for Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSA's), which are collections of counties linked by commuting. 9 As shown in Panels A and B, when running the regressions in those samples, we find that the employment impact of housing net worth shock is unchanged. At the CBSA level, we can crucially also investigate the impact of the housing networth shock on population. We find a progressively increasing impact over time, as individuals move out of more affected regions. However, even by 2016, the population movements between CBSA's were not enough to completely offset the employment losses. These results hold either for total population or working-age population (25-55 years) measures, as Panels C and D illustrate.
For instance, while a 10% change in housing net-worth leads to about 4.8% reduction in CBSA level employment, it only leads to a 3% reduction in local total population, and even less in working-age population, of less than 2%.
9 CBSA's are groups of counties tied to a "core" center with 10,000 people or more through commuting patterns. 2006-2009 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2014 2006-2015 2006-2016 Table 6 shows the impact of the net-worth shock on wages. Strikingly, there is no significant impact. Wages in counties do not appear to adjust in spite of slow population movements that we documented above at the local labor market level.
Effects on wages
We evaluate whether the result might be driven by changes in the composition of the local labor force with use of American Community Survey (ACS) data. With that data, we can follow Katz and Murphy (1992) to calculate the wage for different educational and age groups within each geographic unit and estimate an adjusted wage index by averaging over those wages with fixed weights. We describe the adjustment method in more detail in the appendix.
Panel B of Table 6 shows the corresponding result using the adjusted ACS data, estimated at the level of Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs). We do not find evidence for downward adjustment in wages. Our results are in contrast with those in Beraja et al. (2016) , who find a clear positive correlation between wage changes and employment changes after the Great Recession. In the appendix, we show that we can recover their findings when running OLS, with regions where housing net worth fell by more experiencing statistically significant higher wage reductions. We conclude that, while wages may react to some shocks, they do not seem to react to the large (exogenous) negative net-worth shock suffered by many localities in the recession.
Differential effects across sectors
Next, we investigate the impact of the housing net worth shock on employment within sub-sectors.
We split the sample into five sub-sectors: Tradable (mainly manufacturing), non-tradable (retail and restaurants), construction, high-skilled services (professional and business services, educational services and health services) and others (including, among, others wholesalers and transportation 2006-2009 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2014 2006-2015 2006-2016 Robust standard errors (clustered by state-level) are reported in parentheses. Sample weights (by number of households) are applied to all specifications. ***,**, * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. services). In these sectoral splits, we follow Mian and Sufi (2014) directly, except that we further split the "others" sector from their decomposition into two: a high-skilled and the rest. We describe the details of these splits in appendix B.
These sectoral level results are presented in Table 7 . As in Mian and Sufi (2014) we find that over the first years of the recession, losses in housing net-worth have sizable effects on non-tradable employment and construction. We also find a sizable effect on high-skilled services. The effect on non-tradable employment turns out to be relatively short-lived and flips sign over medium term horizons. In terms of long-term effects, the effects on construction is very persistent, and the effect over high skilled services is similarly large and increasing over the first few years, peaking in 2013.
Employment in other services, which includes heavily linked sectors such as transportation and wholesale, is also persistently affected. In the appendix we use ACS data to confirm that the housing shock had its largest impact on high skilled labor.
Differential effects across ex-ante growth trends
Lastly, we investigate how the effect of the net-worth shock depends on local growth trends. Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) have emphasized that fast growing cities present larger employment responses to demand shocks than slow growing cities. We examine whether we can find a similar differences for the effects of the housing wealth shock. We separate counties based on their employment growth rate from 1990-2003 in three groups: high growth counties are those with growth rates above the 66 percentile; middle growth countries are those with growth rates between the 33 and 66 percentiles;
and the low growth counties are those with growth rate below the 33 percentile. Table 8 shows the relevant results. We find a positive answer, with the effect on ex-ante high growing counties about 50% larger than the effect on ex-ante middle growth counties and the effect on ex-ante slow growing counties not statistically significant from zero. 2006-2009 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2014 2006-2015 2006-2016 Specification  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV Robust standard errors (clustered by state-level) are reported in parentheses. Sample weights (by number of households) are applied to all specifications. ***,**, * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Robustness and sensitivity analyses
We report in appendix A.2 results from several robustness and sensitivity exercises. In particular,
we investigate in greater detail how the impact of the the housing wealth shock on employment and wages change if we adopt an OLS estimator, if we allow for different sets of controls, if we exclude observations from "sand states," and if we use CBSA level observations. We find that results are robust to those modifications, with IV estimates generally implying larger employment and smaller wage effects than OLS estimates.
Conclusion
We show that the housing net worth collapse of 2006-09 had an extraordinarily persistent impact on employment across US counties. In particular, we document that counties that had a larger loss in housing net-worth in that period had more depressed employment as late as 2016. Building on Mian and Sufi (2014) , we use an IV strategy to establish causality for the dynamic and long-run effect of the initial (2006-09) housing net-worth shock on future employment. We show that the negative employment effect of the housing net worth shock has reverted little over the subsequent decade.
Moreover, compared to the short-run effect of the shock, the long horizon effect is less concentrated in the non-tradables sectors and is instead more prominent in the high-skilled service and construction sectors. We also find that the housing net worth shock had its largest impact dynamically on ex-ante fast growing counties. An analysis at the local labor markets level shows that while there is also some negative effect on population over time, it is not enough to offset the long-run decline in employment.
Our findings offer evidence that shocks to household wealth can have long-lasting local employment effects. Thus, it contrasts with the standard view in macroeconomics that household demand shocks could account for short-run fluctuations, but that long-run movements are better explained by changes in technology or other slow moving institutional factors.
A Additional robustness and sensitivity analysis 
A.2 Robustness and sensitivity analysis
Here we show how our results depend on particular specifications. We start by showing the results using OLS to provide a descriptive sense of the key relationships before allowing for potential endogeneity. Those appear in Table A .1 below.
Next, in Table A .2 we show how the yearly results change once we allow for a full set of control variables but maintaining the OLS estimator. 10 Table A .3 shows the results for each year in the IV estimate with all the controls. The coefficients are larger than in our baseline specification. with a 10% reduction in housing net-worth implying a 1.55% decline in nominal wages by 2016.
Together with the OLS point estimate for the private employment impact of the housing net-worth shock of about 2.2% they imply a wage elasticity of about 0.7, close to prior findings by Beraja 10 We include as controls the share of 23 industries in our baseline regressions, as well as the pre-trends (growth rate in employment between 1998 and 2002 and between 2003 and 2006) . In full set of controls, additionally, we include various socio-economic characteristics of the population of the region (race, income, home ownership, education, unemployment rates, poverty and urbanization). We also include in full set of controls construction, oil industry, and government employment shares as controls.
et al. (2016) . Table A .6 shows the break-down of the nominal wage effect by sector and Table A.7 the break-down of the real wage effect by sector. It shows that, whereas the total wage impact of the housing shock is indistinguishable from zero, there is substantial wage declines in the nontradable and construction sectors. Tables A.8 and A.9 show that the zero overall impact of the housing shock on wages is also present when we run regressions at the CBSA level or allow for all the controls. Finally, Table A.11 shows how employment changes at the regional level by skill and age, confirming that most of the employment reduction occurs among the highly skilled workers. 2006-2009 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2014 2006-2015 2006-2016 2006-2009 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2014 2006-2015 2006-2016 2006-2009 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2014 2006-2015 2006-2016 2006-2009 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2014 2006-2015 2006-2016 Observations  479  479  479  479  479  479  479  479  Specification  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV Robust standard errors (clustered by state-level) are reported in parentheses. Sample weights (by number of households) are applied to all specifications. ***,**, * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 2006-2009 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2014 2006-2015 2006-2016 Robust standard errors (clustered by state-level) are reported in parentheses. Sample weights (by number of households) are applied to all specifications. ***,**, * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 2006-2009 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2014 2006-2015 2006-2016 Specification  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV Robust standard errors (clustered by state-level) are reported in parentheses. Sample weights (by number of households) are applied to all specifications. ***,**, * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 2006-2009 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2014 2006-2015 2006-2016 Specification  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV Robust standard errors (clustered by state-level) are reported in parentheses. Sample weights (by number of households) are applied to all specifications. ***,**, * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 2006-2009 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2014 2006-2015 2006-2016 2006-2009 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2014 2006-2015 2006-2016 Specification  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV 2006-2009 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2014 2006-2015 2006-2016 2006-2009 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2014 2006-2015 2006-2016 Observations  772  772  772  772  772  772  772  772  Specification  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV We exclude any individual with a zero wage and truncate the measured wage distribution at the top and bottom one percent.
We adjust the hourly wages by creating a composition-adjusted wage measure following Katz and Murphy (1992) . We divide our sample into six age bins (25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54) and four education bins (completed years of schooling < 12, = 12, between 13 and 15, and 16+ 
